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SOME PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF
PROSECUTING PUBLIC OFFICIALS*




The Problem of Prosecutorial Power
In our legal system, the prosecutor wields tremendous power. His
authority to compel testimony of witnesses under oath and to sub-
poena documents creates enormous risk of harassment and serious
injury to innocent people if misused. In addition to extraordinary
power, the prosecutor possesses extraordinary discretion that is sweep-
ing, unreviewable and, for the most part, is exercised in secret.
By himself, he may initiate an investigation, determine its course
and scope, decide whom to call as witnesses, define the crimes to be
charged, dispose of cases through negotiated pleas, and decide whom
to recommend for indictment.
Much of the prosecutor's power derives from his relationship
with the grand jury. While many of the leading judicial decisions over
the past two decades have operated to benefit criminal suspects, the
courts have reaffirmed and expanded the power of the grand jury.1
Originally conceived by the Founding Fathers as a protective buffer to
insulate the suspect from arbitrary or malicious government action, the
* This article is based on a lecture sponsored by the Baltimore Chapter of the
Federal Bar Association and given at the University of Maryland School of Law on
April 28, 1976.
** Member, New York and District of Columbia Bar; Assistant Special Prosecu-
tor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force, U.S. Department of Justice, 1973-1975.
Associate, Rogovin, Stern & Huge, Washington, D.C.
1. United States v. Mandujano, 44 U.S.L.W. 4629 (U.S., May 19, 1976); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) ; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) ;
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
(5)
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grand jury in the 20th century has become more and more a rubber
stamp for the prosecutor. 2 Grand jury proceedings are required to be
conducted under the most stringent veil of secrecy; courtroom rules of
evidence are inapplicable; and a witness may not be accompanied by his
attorney during the interrogation. 3 The prosecutor may inquire into
any matter that is related to the investigation.' The grand jury
may compel production of evidence such as handwriting and voice
exemplars, fingerprints and under certain circumstances corporate
records, even though a prosecutor or a policeman would otherwise
have to obtain a judicial warrant showing probable cause under the
fourth amendment to seize the material.'
The grand jury rarely comes into contact with anyone but prose-
cutors for any extended period of time. The jurors rely on the
prosecutors for charging recommendations and for presentation of
evidence - there is no legal obligation, for example, that prosecutors
present evidence exculpatory of a person whom they will ask the
grand jury to indict. If a grand jury refuses to indict a suspect, the
prosecutor can usually resubmit the matter to another grand jury.6
The grand jury is central to cases involving corruption by public
officials. It provides the prosecutor with invaluable tools for uncover-
ing sophisticated wrongdoing, not the least of which is nationwide
subpoena power.7 Moreover, in an ordinary grand jury investigation,
suspects are likely to heed their lawyers' advice to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege, since any false statement made to the grand
jury may be used against them, either to prove guilt at subsequent
trials or as the basis for perjury prosecutions. But where a public
2. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON PROSECUTION 34-37 (1931) (The "Wickersham Commission").
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d). See United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980
(6th Cir. 1968) ; In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); cf. In re Groban, 352 U.S.
330 (1957).
4. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 65 (1906); Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143, 147 n.2 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 944 (1963); United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 301 (3d
Cir. 1954).
5. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Mara,
410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplars); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973) (voice exemplars) ; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944) (records
of unincorporated association subpoenaed from officer of same); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911) (corporate records may be subpoenaed from cor-
porate officer who has custody or control regardless of whether they may tend to
incriminate him); United States v. Fago, 319 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 906 (1963).
6. United States v. One 1940 Oldsmobile Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 404, 406
(7th Cir. 1948).
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e) (1).
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official is under investigation, the spectacle of being identified by the
media as one who has refused to cooperate with investigators may
deter him from asserting the privilege.
B.
Restrictions on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Powers
While the prosecutor functions in an adversary system, his respon-
sibility for the exercise of the sweeping discretionary power granted
to him "differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict."" To be more specific, it is the prosecu-
tor's obligation to serve the ends of impartial justice by protecting the
innocent and guarding the rights of the accused in addition to convict-
ing the guilty. The prosecutor is required to make many of the de-
cisions that a client normally makes in our legal system: in a sense, he
is the lawyer and the client rolled into one. The prosecutor, then, is
both an advocate in the criminal justice system and also an adminis-
trator of that system.
Naturally, there are a variety of legal and ethical restraints on the
prosecutor's freedom designed to serve the public interest and protect
individual rights. The prosecutor is not supposed to go off on a "fishing
expedition" by initiating an investigation or issuing a subpoena just
because he believes that some area may be ripe for discovery of criminal
activity.9 He may not act out of self-interest or exploit his office by
means of personal publicity. 1" A witness whom the prosecutor believes
may have been involved in criminal activity, when called before the
grand jury, should be advised of the nature and scope of the grand
jury's investigation." He should further be advised of his right to
remain silent and to have an attorney outside the grand jury room
with whom he may consult.' 2 A suspect should be advised that, if
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-13 (Final Draft, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as CODE].
9. See, e.g., ABA Standards Relating To The Prosecution Function, § 3.1(a),
Commentary (Approved Draft, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosecution Standards].
In fact, there are few judicially-imposed limitations on the prosecutor's discretion to
initiate investigations. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43
(1950) ("[T]he Grand Jury . . .can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."); cases cited
note 4 supra. Subpoena duces tecum can be quashed if "unreasonable or oppressive."
FED. R. CRim. P. 17(c).
10. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 1.3(a).
11. See id., § 3.6(d).
12. Id.; see United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 897 (1955). The Supreme Court this term has held that false testimony given
by a target of a grand jury inquiry may be used to prosecute him for perjury even
19761
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it is his intention to assert his fifth amendment privilege when sub-
poenaed before the grand jury, by stating this intention in advance
he can avoid being brought into the jury room; thus he will not be
prejudiced by refusing to answer questions in front of -the jurors."3
And indictments, of course, may be based only upon probable cause.'4
But the fact is that neither court decisions nor established ethical
norms such as the Code of Professional Responsibility and the various
American Bar Association standards really provide any meaningful
guidance to prosecutors faced with certain difficult decisions during a
white collar or public corruption investigation. The ABA Committee
that developed the Standards Relating To The Prosecution Function
has urged that "it is the duty of the prosecutor to become intimately
familiar with and adhere to the legal and ethical standards governing
the performance of his official duties."' 5 Yet these rules are often vague
and general. In many instances, the standard of conduct they impose
on prosecutors is a loose one. In searching for practical guides to
ethical behavior, more often than not, the prosecutor is thrown back on
his own subjective values and notions about fundamental fairness. In
the end, the principal guarantee to the public that the prosecutor's
power will be exercised properly and ethically is not the prosecutor's
obligation to adhere to any well-developed system of ethical rules, but
is rather the prosecutor's own personal integrity, professional compe-
tence and intellectual devotion to concepts of fairness.
This article discusses a few of the more significant practical prob-
lems prosecutors face in political corruption cases. These problems give
rise to difficult questions of ethics and equitable treatment that are sel-
dom resolved by any general rules of prosecutorial conduct. The article
also deals with specific prosecutorial functions - such as plea bargain-
ing procedures - that pose more direct and well-publicized ethical
issues. Here again, reference to established ethical norms seems to
answer few of the hard questions involved.
though he was not given the full warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). United States v. Manduiano, 44 U.S.L.W. 4629 (U.S. May 19, 1976).
However, Chief Justice Burger in his plurality opinion for the Court stressed the fact
that the defendant had in fact been warned that he did not have to answer questions
that might incriminate him and that he was entitled to have an attorney present out-
side the jury room, with whom he might consult. The Court thus left open the ques-
tion of whether a prosecutor's total failure to give warnings to a target of an in-
vestigation who is later indicted for perjury, or whose admissions the prosecution
seeks to offer as evidence at trial, would be permissible.
13. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.6(e).
14. U.S. CosT. amend. V.




Practical Problems of Prosecuting Public Corruption
Prosecutorial investigation of white collar and organized crime,
of which public corruption cases are typical, is closely linked to trial.
It is thus unlike legislative investigation, where the object is simply to
unearth the facts. For the legislative investigator, from whom, how,
and in what sequence the evidence is obtained is of secondary import-
ance. If at a legislative hearing there is conflicting testimony, if wit-
nesses change their stories, if committee members must cross-examine
cooperative as well as hostile witnesses, so much the better. These
conflicts show that the committee is on the ball, and that the investiga-
tion has struck pay dirt. But the prosecutor is customarily judged by
whether he obtains convictions, in spite of the maxim that the Govern-
ment "always wins" when justice is done whether the defendant is
found guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor's purpose is not just to find
out what happened, but in the course of getting the facts to construct
a successful courtroom case. The second objective is usually much
harder to attain than the first.
Public corruption cases are made on the testimony of insiders who
are usually participants in the crimes, supported by whatever corrobora-
tion is available from physical and circumstantial evidence. The prose-
cutor must be able to induce insiders to come forward and tell what
they know. Then, after the facts are assembled, he must have witnesses
who will take the stand at trial on behalf of the Government. Some
of those responsible have to be used to convict the others. Sometimes
the public fails to understand that, except in the rarest case, everyone
who is culpable cannot be a defendant. Consequently, the prosecutor
faces a series of very hard choices. Unfortunately, although these
choices affect the overall direction of the case, they often have to be
made early in the investigation, while it is still unravelling, without
the benefit of complete information. Having to make such choices be-
fore the facts are fully developed creates what is probably the greatest
risk of miscalculation in investigating this type of crime.
Good judgment alone cannot make a public corruption investigation
successful, however. The heart of any corruption case is plain hard
work: attention to detail, persistence in building up the facts from
a host of different sources, and meticulous preparation, as well as a
healthy measure of good luck. One reason for this is that guilt or
innocence in public corruption cases often hinges on very small dif-
ferences in testimony and subtle interpretations of motive and intent.
These delicate distinctions are especially troublesome for the prosecutor
when the targets of the investigation are already familiar with the testi-
19761
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mony that will be given against them and can construct a defense to
meet it. For example, the Watergate cover-up succeeded in part because
lawyers for the Committee to Re-Elect the President participated in
interviews by investigators of individual employees of the Committee."6
The architects of the cover-up were thereby able to learn most of the
details of the case as it was being built. Often, out of residual loyalty
to their former confederates, cooperating witnesses will keep them
informed of the infoimation they are providing to authorities. In the
Watergate cover-up investigation the Ervin Committee's decision to
call their more cooperative witnesses such as Jeb Magruder and John
Dean before they called H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman gave
the latter a golden opportunity to tailor their stories to the testimony
of others.
Leaks are the bane of the prosecutor's existence in a public cor-
ruption case. Publication in the press of inside information about an
investigation usually harms the prosecutors more than those who are
the suspects in the investigation, because it puts the prosecutors in a
vulnerable position with the public and apprises the suspects of the
status of the case against them. Prosecutors ordinarily have a strong
tactical interest as well as an ethical obligation to prevent leaks from
emanating from the Government side. Lawyers for cooperating wit-
nesses may use the technique of leaks for a variety of reasons, including
bargaining for a better deal for their clients. In addition, both witnesses
and prospective defendants in an investigation may leak information
in order to counteract rumors implicating them more deeply in im-
proper activity than was actually the case.
No matter how much hard work and preparation have gone into
a case, it may prove fruitless if the prosecutors cannot produce at trial
live witnesses whose, testimony will be believed by the jury. Usually,
where the defendant is a public official, he comes into the courtroom as
a pillar of the comm'u'ity, One Who by the position he holds has already
demonstrated that he commands the trust and respect of a large seg-
ment of the electorate. 'For example, during the voir dire in the Water-
gate cover-up trial' 7 Judge John Sirica, in questioning a potential juror,
referred to the defendants as "these fine gentlemen." After the juror
had been excused the 'chief Government prosecutorgot up and objected
16. For a discussion of the ethical problems involved when an attorney represent-
ing an organization under investigation by a grand jury also represents employees of
the organization who are -potential prosecution witnesses, see WATERGATE SPECIAL
PROSECUTION FORCE, UsITm, STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT 140-41
(October 1975).
17. United States v. -lMitchell, Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C. 1974).
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to the judge's reference. Defense lawyers angrily replied that at this
stage of the trial the defendants were presumed to be fine gentlemen.
The government prosecutor responded evenly that they were presumed
to be innocent, but that did not mean they were presumed to be fine
gentlemen. This impression of rectitude, nurtured by the defense
through character witnesses and through the defendant's own testimony
when he takes the stand, will usually be conveyed to the jury.
In contrast, the principal Government witnesses will usually have
acknowledged their role in the criminal activity in which they seek to
implicate the defendants. If the trial boils down' to a contest of credi-
bility between the government witnesses and the defendants, the defense
counsel will -seek to define the issue to the jury in terms of whether
they believe the "fine gentlemen" on trial, or a bunch of confessed
criminals and others who have violated the public trust.
The inherent credibility problem involved in using insider-wit-
nesses makes skillful use of corroboration, no matter how seemingly
trivial, a necessity. In Watergate the prosecution had the best corrobora-
tion available: tape recordings of the defendants' own conversations.
In other public corruption cases however, the critical role of corrobora-
tion often places strong pressure on prosecutors to engage in surrepitious
electronic surveillance or the use of planted informants.
Many experienced prosecutors argue that without use of these tech-
niques, comprehensive enforcement of anti-corruption -statutes against
public officials is virtually impossible. Without judging the merits of
this dispute, it suffices to say that the issue was never faced in the
Watergate cover-up investigation because the opportunity never arose.
Nevertheless, the painful parallel between prosecutorially-initiated elec-
tronic surveillance and the Watergate bugging was not lost upon the
Watergate prosecutors; they were convinced that in that particular
investigation electronic snooping by the Government - even though
sanctioned by court order - would never be tolerated by the public.
An example occurred during the United States Attorney's investigation
into corruption in Baltimore County, Maryland that eventually led to
conviction of Vice President Spiro Agnew. Use of evidence obtained
by electronic surveillance - by a cooperating. witness who "wired"
himself and recorded a conversation with a suspect whom prosecutors
believed was attempting to importune the witness - resulted at trial
in a swift acquittal by the jury.""
Legal requirements relating to pre-trial discovery compound the
prosecutor's difficulties. The so-called "Jencks Act"' 9 requires the
18. United States v. Overton, No. 74-0344 (D. Md. 1974).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
1976]
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Government to turn over to the defense for use at trial all grand jury
testimony and written or recorded "statements" of Government wit-
nesses that are related to their trial testimony. While the law techni-
cally limits discoverable statements to recordings or transcriptions that
are "substantially verbatim" and made "contemporaneously" with the
oral declaration of the witness, 20 in the past prosecution notes of dis-
cussions with witnesses, memoranda summarizing witness interviews
and like material, no matter how sketchy or incomplete, often have been
held discoverable. 2 1 The careful prosecutor does not take any chances,
so everything goes over to the defense.
Similarly, while the letter of the Jencks Act requires only that
discoverable material be produced after the Government witness has
testified on direct examination, some trial courts interpret this provi-
sion broadly to mean that the material should be produced suffi-
ciently in advance of the witness's appearance that the defense can
make effective use of it.22 Consequently, the Government often hands
over to the defense all notes, memoranda, and recorded grand jury testi-
mony of everyone who might be called at trial as a government witness
at least a few weeks before trial. In addition, the constitutional man-
date of Brady v. Maryland" requires the Government to turn over to
the defense for use at trial any arguably exculpatory evidence in its
possession. This requirement may as a practical matter oblige the
prosecutor to turn over grand jury testimony, interviews of most
potential defense witnesses and any other evidence gathered during
the investigation that does not fit into his own case.
Disclosure requirements pose particular problems in a case that
depends on the testimony of insider-witnesses. Because of initial re-
luctance in the early stages of the investigation, some or all of the
Government's witnesses may not be entirely candid with the investiga-
tors. If the prosecutors take notes during these early sessions with a
witness and later turn them over to the defense at trial, the defense may
take advantage of any conflicting statements when it cross-examines
the witnesses. The defense will suggest to the jury that a witness
changed his testimony to coincide with what the prosecutors wanted
to hear in order to get a better deal for himself. Many prosecutors are
consequently reluctant to take even the sketchiest notes of interviews
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (2) (1970).
21. But see Goldberg v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1338 (1976).
22. Cf. United States v, Seafarers Int'l Union, 343 F. Supp. 779, 788 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (failure of government to meet pretrial discovery obligations held prejudicial
to defense).
23. 373 U.S. 83 (1969); a*cord, United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir.
1967) ; Ashley v. State, 319 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1963).
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with a potential trial witness until they feel confident that the witness
is being completely candid. Some wait until the witness's testimony is
finally taken under oath before the grand jury, where in almost all
federal jurisdictions it is transcribed verbatim. Other prosecutors take
notes in the form of "questions" they will ask before the grand jury,
on the theory that such material is not discoverable.
The question of whether the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office
should institute an across-the-board policy of making written memo-
randa of the substance of all witness interviews illustrates the type of
hidden ethical problems that could have an important impact on the
outcome of an investigation and trial. Early in the Watergate investi-
gation, Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox issued an official policy
statement requiring all investigators to make such memoranda for their
files. The practice seemed necessary to guard against lapses of memory
and to generate a solid data base. However, the experienced prosecu-
tors on the staff protested that by this policy the office might be cutting
its own throat. No law or ethical obligation required a prosecutor to
write a substantive memorandum every time he talked to a witness.
Balky witnesses might be questioned many times before they divulged
the full extent of their knowledge. Other witnesses who were trying to
be candid might find that their recollections had been inaccurate, until
refreshed by evidence obtained later in the investigation. Moreover the
system was subject to normal human infirmity, in that different prose-
cutors might write slightly different accounts of the same story. In
each of these instances, the Government witness would face the defense
at trial with the burden of having given apparently "conflicting" state-
ments.
In the final analysis, Special Prosecutor Cox was not persuaded
by these tactical considerations. He decided that the unusual responsi-
bilities placed upon the Watergate prosecution required the creation of
a clear internal record that would bear the scrutiny of history, reflecting
the thoroughness of the investigation. Cox believed that the only way
to prove that the prosecutors had persisted in a policy of utmost fairness
to the potential defendants was to write down everything the witnesses
said when they came to our offices. If witnesses vacillated in their
accounts, that was something the defendants would ultimately be en-
titled to know in fashioning their defense.
All of these factors, common to most white-collar cases, are ac-
centuated in the public corruption case by a number of additional con-
siderations. Publicity in such cases is extraordinary. Witnesses and
potential defendants are usually represented by uncommonly able and
sophisticated defense counsel. Finally, highly publicized criticism of
1976]
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the investigation and of investigators - their tactics, their motives, and
the substance of their case - can usually be expected from the investi-
gation's targets. The prosecutors, on the other hand, are ethically bound
not to defend themselves in the press.24 As long as criticism is aimed
principally at the cooperating witnesses, the prosecutors are at least
partially shielded. This was true to some extent early in the Agnew
case and in the Watergate case, which presented the extraordinary
spectacle of the Government itself, through the White House, mounting
a coordinated public relations campaign to destroy the credibility of
John Dean, the Government's own chief witness. Where a target of
an investigation stages a media campaign to convince the public of his
innocence through criticism directed at the prosecutors themselves, it
is of course much more difficult for the prosecutors to endure. And yet,
as much as the prosecutors may rage in private over the unfairness of
the system that forbids them to strike back, that is the unavoidable price
they pay for the extraordinary power and discretion at their command.
Perhaps contrary to popular belief, most prosecutors are reluctant
to go after high-ranking elected officials unless it appears that very
solid evidence of criminality can be adduced. This reluctance is based
not so much on fear of the public official's power as on respect for his
role in the political system. The dilemma faced by the Watergate
prosecutors and the grand jury investigating President Nixon -
whether the inquiry should be pursued through the criminal justice
system or through the constitutional process of impeachment - was not
unique. Our system of separate powers has fostered a strong institu-
tional and historical understanding that the ultimate and most appro-
priate sanction against the wrongdoing of elected public officials and
their direct appointees is through the political process, not the criminal
law. This understanding is expressed in the Constitution only in cases
involving a sitting President 25 and certain actions of senators and
congressmen 6 but it is also an implicit factor in other cases where mis-
conduct by elected officials is at issue.
The decision to investigate and charge a public official with a
crime inevitably takes the prosecutor into unfamiliar and dangerous
territory. The public interest in the integrity and continued effective
functioning of government comes into play. This is a factor that the
prosecutor, who is not directly accountable to the electorate, finds dis-
comforting to assess. As for the politician or public official, he is likely
to suffer irreparable injury if indicted, regardless of the outcome of the
24. See CODE, supra, note 8, DR 7-107.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 and art. II, § 4.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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trial. And no matter how strong his case, the prosecutor also rarely
emerges unscathed. If he obtains a conviction he will likely be accused
of political bias, of "fronting" for the political enemies of the defendant,
and of usurping the role of the electorate in policing the morality of its
public officials. If the jury refuses to convict, all of these accusations
may be confirmed in the public mind, and the prosecutor himself may
be destroyed. A responsible prosecutor will seldom be eager to incur
these risks to himself and to the public without a case founded on par-
ticularly compelling evidence.
On the other hand, in the wake of Watergate the prosecutor faces
an additional hazard. When the media has identified a public official
as having engaged in questionable conduct, fear of public criticism for
failure to indict may drive an insecure prosecutor to institute charges
that would not otherwise have been brought against the official. This
problem may be especially acute, ironically, where criticism of the in-
vestigation by the suspected official has been heavy. To save face, to
show that evidence of wrongdoing really does exist, a prosecutor may
be maneuvered against his better judgment into proceeding to trial with
evidence that is substantial, but is insufficient to assure a conviction.
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox often commented that the
most difficult decisions in the Watergate prosecution were decisions
not to indict.
Apart from the necessity for meticulous and often boring hard
work, prosecuting public corruption is very much a craft, with its own
set of techniques. Skillful use of these techniques can be crucial to the
outcome of the case. One example is the technique of persuading wit-
nesses who may be criminally involved to cooperate in the investigation.
The prosecutor's object here is to get more for less: to obtain useful
information and the witness's trial testimony without losing the option
to prosecute him. The witness's object ordinarily is to determine how
he will be treated by the prosecutors before he risks incriminating him-
self by disclosing his and others' involvement. If the assurances ex-
tended by the prosecutor are too narrow, he may fail to win the wit-
ness's cooperation; if they are too broad, he may unnecessarily forfeit
his option to prosecute the witness, should the witness turn out to have
been guilty of pervasive criminal conduct.
The prosecutorial technique most familiar to the public in this
situation is "immunity." In practice, that word has a broad range of
meaning and uses. Until 1970, federal statutes provided for so-called
"transactional" immunity. 7 Under these laws, a witness who refused
27. For a listing of the federal immunity statutes in effect prior to 1970, see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERs
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to testify before a grand jury could be compelled under threat of con-
tempt to give up his fifth amendment right and answer the jury's
questions if he was guaranteed by a formal court order that he would
not be prosecuted for any transaction about which he testified.28 In
the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 the Nixon-Mitchell Justice
Department replaced transactional immunity with "testimonial" im-
munity.29 Witnesses could still be compelled to talk, but the protection
accorded them by the immunity order was narrower. The witness was
assured only that neither his compelled testimony nor any other evidence
derived directly or indirectly from it could be used against him in a sub-
sequent prosecution.3" The Government can prosecute a witness who
has received testimonial or "use" immunity, but it must first demon-
strate that its case is based only upon evidence obtained independently
from the compelled disclosures.31
Aside from this complicated statutory mechanism, by making
a simple promise to a witness or his lawyer a prosecutor can confer
informal testimonial immunity that is just as binding on the Govern-
ment as a formal court order, even though it may never be com-
mitted to writing. To find out what a witness can testify to, the
prosecutor may simply agree that nothing the witness says in an
office interview will be used against him directly or indirectly. The
witness's lawyer may then take copious notes to make a record of
everything his client discloses during the interview. The promise made
by the prosecutor is judicially enforceable. Here, the prosecutor has
to be careful not to "buy a pig in a poke." Once accorded informal
use immunity, a witness may confess his own guilt, making it difficult
ever to prosecute him for what he has admitted, and then claim that
he knows nothing about the criminal conduct of others. An immunized
witness is not protected from prosecution for perjury, but if the prose-
cutors cannot prove that the witness is lying they will have lost the
option of charging him with a crime to encourage his complete candor.
Before agreeing to informal immunity, a prosecutor can evaluate a
witness's testimony in a number of ways. For example, the witness's
attorney may make an "offer of proof," a hypothetical statement of
what his client might say if granted certain assurances. Of course,
everyone understands that there is nothing hypothetical about the state-
1444-45 (1970) ; and Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and
Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
28. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
29. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6000-05 (1970).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970).
31. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1973).
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ments; the lawyer is describing what his client really knows. But the
client is protected, because what his lawyer tells the prosecutor cannot
be used against the client if negotiations break down. It is highly im-
proper, and almost surely grounds for a mistrial, for a prosecutor to
cross-examine a defendant who has taken the stand at trial by referring
to his lawyer's prior out-of-court "hypothetical" statements concerning
the client's knowledge or conduct.
Occasionally the client himself may make his own hypothetical
statement. In effect, the prosecutors interview the witness "off the
record," agreeing that his statements made during the interview will
never be used directly against him as admissions in any trial. This
technique is used principally when the defense lawyer is aggressively
seeking to sell the prosecutor on the value of his client as a trial witness
rather than a defendant. The off-the-record interview does not bar
prosecutors from using a witness's disclosures to develop more evidence
against him. In that respect it is less protective of the witness than
informal testimonial immunity.
If the prosecutor decides, based on these informal techniques, that
a particular individual's culpability is minimal compared to that of
others, and that his testimony will be useful at trial, the prosecutor may
extend a conditional assurance that the individual will be a witness,
rather than a defendant in the case. The assurance is conditioned on
the individual's complete candor and cooperation throughout the pro-
ceedings. If the prosecutor subsequently finds that the individual has
been holding back, the deal is off, and the individual will probably be
prosecuted. This promise of witness status is called "equitable im-
munity." Again, a simple oral promise by the prosecutor, sometimes
but not always recorded in a letter to counsel or an internal office
memorandum, binds the Government and represents an important de-
cision in the case.
When a prosecutor concludes that a potential witness has been
deeply involved in criminal acts, he will usually abandon consideration
of either formal or informal immunity and notify the individual that
he is being viewed as a potential defendant. This does not mean that
the prosecutor has given up hope of getting the individual's testimony
in the trials of his confederates; cooperation may still be sought through
plea-bargaining, which is discussed at more length below.
The extent of the prosecutor's power to grant immunity illustrates
not only the wide discretion granted -to prosecutors but also the largely
invisible way in which that discretion is exercised. Yet there are no
guidelines, rules, nor articulated values that command a consensus
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among prosecutors to which one can turn for assistance in making
the difficult decisions that arise in the course of this process.
III.
Four Areas of Prosecutorial Ethics
A.
Building Safeguards Into the Investigatory and
Charging Processes
The investigation of the Watergate bugging and cover-up by the
Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office was conducted according to in-
ternal prosecutorial guidelines designed to provide more stringent safe-
guards for individual rights than those afforded in run-of-the-mill
criminal cases. The Watergate prosecutors' unwillingness to employ
procedures customarily followed in other prosecutors' offices or to take
as their standards the minimum required by law resulted in part from
the importance of the case and from the intense scrutiny by the public,
through the media, of the prosecutors' actions. In addition, because
the Special Prosecution Force was endowed with an unusual degree of
autonomy, making it accountable virtually to no one except the public,
continued public support was absolutely essential to the success of the
investigation. The Watergate prosecutors believed, therefore, that it
was incumbent upon them to conduct a showcase prosecution, scrupu-
lously fair in appearance as well as in fact. At every stage they at-
tempted to build into the investigation procedures to insure that the
rights of those involved would not be infringed in any way, and to
lean over backwards to make certain that no one could accuse them of
overzealousness, impropriety, or unfairness.
Few of these procedures were followed by other prosecutors' offices,
or were required by existing ethical standards. None were mandated
by legal restraints on the prosecutor's power. Yet all were deemed
necessary to make certain that the Watergate investigation was scrupu-
lously fair and that the benefit of uncertainty would be given to the
accused, not to the Government.
One example of this approach was the policy described above of
taking notes during every office interview with a witness. Another
example was a policy of informing individuals that they were under
investigation and inviting them to make any statement or presentation
they desired if they chose to appear before the grand jury. If a prospec-
tive defendant decided that he should assert his fifth amendment priv-
ilege, he was not called before the grand jury, but was asked to submit
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a letter to the prosecutor stating his intention, in lieu of a grand jury
appearance.32 Although there is no obligation to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury,88 prosecutors in the Watergate investigation
made it their firm policy to do so. The prosecutors advised all suspects
that the Government would be willing to bring any evidence favorable
to those individuals before the grand jurors, if it was called to the
prosecutors' attention by defense counsel. On a number of occasions,
persons under investigation took advantage of this offer.
In the ordinary criminal case there are very few safeguards for the
accused at the charging stage. The requirement that an indictment be
based on probable cause is in truth an indefinite limitation: probable
cause can be based on secondary evidence, hearsay evidence, circum-
stantial evidence, even on tainted evidence. 4 Probable cause is some-
thing more than suspicion, but something far less than convincing proof
of guilt. Established ethical standards offer little guidance to the
prosecutor respecting the charging decision. The ABA Standards Re-
lating to the Prosecution Function caution that the "prosecutor should
establish standards and procedures for evaluating complaints to deter-
mine whether criminal proceedings should be instituted." 5 But neither
32. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.6(e) recommends this procedure
in all cases. Watergate prosecutors demanded a written statement of intention for
their files, rather than an oral representation, to record formally the fact that they
had not simply been remiss in seeking the witness's testimony.
33. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 3.6(b) provides that "[T]he prosecution should
disclose to the grand jury any evidence which he knows will tend to negate guilt."
(emphasis added). This is a narrower category than "exculpatory" evidence, which
may constitute anything materially helpful to the defense case.
In addition, the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY urges that "a
prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he be-
lieves it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused." CODE, EC 7-13.
Pursuit of evidence tending to weaken the prosecution's case is a tactical as well as
an ethical responsibility, because the prosecutor cannot competently judge the strength
of his case at trial or decide upon an optimum trial strategy without knowing the
weaknesses in his own evidence and the defenses he will likely face. Similarly, the
competent prosecutor is usually eager to interrogate a prospective defense witness
before the grand jury in order to commit his version of events to testimony under
oath. Thus, at trial, the prosecutor will know what to expect from the witness; and
if the witness changes his story, the prosecutor can impeach him with his prior con-
flicting grand jury testimony.
34. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally obtained evi-
dence) ; Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (same) ; Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (hearsay or incompetent evidence). PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.6(a) states that the prosecutor, "should present to the
grand jury only evidence which he believes would be admissible at trial." As a
practical matter, this provision is universally ignored by prosecutors, particularly
where the grand jury is being used as an investigative tool, as it nearly always is in
political corruption cases.
35. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.4(b).
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the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the ABA Standards indi-
cate specifically how these standards and procedures should be defined.
The Code simply echoes the legal requirement of probable cause. 6 The
ABA Prosecution Standards go no further: they provide that the prose-
cutor should not bring charges he cannot "reasonably support with
evidence at trial."3 7 The commentary to this Standard observes that
the prosecution ought to have a prima facie case - i.e., enough evidence
to survive a defense motion for directed verdict of acquittal at the end
of the prosecution's direct case. However, this formulation overlooks
knowledge the prosecutor may have about potential defenses, such as an
airtight alibi.
In the Watergate investigation the evidence against potential de-
fendants was not weighed against the standard of probable cause but
against a much higher standard: whether the prosecutors were con-
vinced to a reasonable certainty that after hearing the Government's
evidence and the probable defense case, a jury would conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. This higher standard
is probably close to that actually employed by many other responsible
prosecutors, especially in public corruption cases. Regardless of the
strength of the evidence, prosecutors rarely recommend indictment even
in ordinary cases unless they are personally convinced that the pros-
pective defendant is guilty"8 and that there is a good chance of con-
viction. The salient point is that neither legal nor ethical requirements
impose a standard higher than probable cause.
3 '9
36. The prosecutor should not institute charges "when he knows or it is obvious
that the charges are not supported by probable cause." CODE, supra note 2, DR
7-103 (A).
37. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.9(e).
38. See Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
174, 178 (1965). The ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.9(b) (i)
allows that the prosecutor "may" decide not to go forward if he has "reasonable doubt
that the accused is in fact guilty." Whether a decision not to charge under such
circumstances should be mandatory rather than permissive is the subject of some lively
dispute. Compare M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 85-88
(1975) with Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of An Ethical Standard:
Guidance From the ABA, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 1145 (1973).
39. Prosecutors in the Watergate cover-up investigation were not faced with the
related problem that occurs in some official corruption cases of whether it is proper
to charge the target of an investigation with offenses ancillary to the investigation's
original focus, evidence of which has been developed by prosecutors motivated by a
desire to punish the defendant for more serious crimes that they cannot prove: for
example, charging a public official accused of being "on the take" not with accepting
bribes but with tax evasion or perjury. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 80-84.
Use of conspiracy law is sometimes criticized as an example of this practice
and is unquestionably subject to substantial abuse by prosecutors. In the Watergate
cover-up prosecution, all but one of the seven defendants originally indicted in United
States v. Mitchell, Crim. No. 74-110 (D.D.C. 1974) were charged with the sub-
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If the Watergate prosecutors were inclined to recommend an
indictment based on a reasonable certainty of obtaining a conviction,
they invited the prospective defendant's lawyer to come (with his
client, if he desired) into the office to present an oral argument against
indictment. Permitting an accused to make a pre-indictment "pre-
sentation" to the prosecutors is not unheard of in white collar cases,
but the Special Prosecutor's Office carried the policy to unusual lengths,
making it into the equivalent of an informal adversary hearing on the
indictment decision itself. Customarily, the prosecutors began by sum-
marizing the evidence against the prospective defendant and describing
the charges they contemplated bringing against him. Typically, this
presentation provoked a heated give-and-take, in which the prosecutors
usually ended up describing their theory of the case and the evidence
in even more detail. In one particular instance the prospective defendant
and his lawyer engaged in a several-hour-long debate with the prose-
cutors, in which both sides freely discussed their respective interpre-
tations of the evidence. This was particularly unusual because the
target of an investigation seldom meets personally with the prosecutors
unless his attorney has carefully determined beforehand that the inter-
view will be off-the-record. Another pre-indictment "presentation" took
place in a series of informal meetings and debates with defense counsel
that lasted several weeks. Defense counsel even turned up at one point
with several large, multi-colored charts by which they dramatized their
client's asserted innocence.
Certainly it is reasonable to suggest that every prosecutor ought to
be under an affirmative ethical obligation to ensure that both he and
the grand jury are exposed to both sides of a prospective criminal case,
and whenever possible the defendant should also have some opportunity
for input into the charging decision, even if the opportunity falls short
of a full adversary hearing. However, present ethical standards do not
even touch on this subject.
Finally, in the cover-up case the Watergate prosecutors took an
extremely liberal position regarding pre-trial discovery, turning over
to the defendants virtually everything in their files relating to the trial.
The object was to insure that nothing relevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence was kept from the defense for tactical advantage. Discovery
rules now embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,0
stantive offense of obstruction of justice as well as with conspiracy; actual evidence
of meetings and conversations among the defendants unequivocally designed to further
the illegal purposes of the cover-up conspiracy was ample; and the jury was carefully
instructed that the culpability of each defendant could be premised only on his own
action and statements, not those of others.
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 and 17.
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though recently liberalized, require far less, but in fact progressive
judges have begun to apply the discovery rules more liberally for the
general purpose of preventing unfairness or surprise to the defense.4 '
In this respect, the courts have moved much faster than the bar to insure
prosecutorial fairness.
One innovation that a few state courts have recently adopted in
selected cases is to permit witnesses to be accompanied by an attorney
before the grand jury.12 The Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office did
not adopt this policy. In white collar grand jury investigations, the
prohibition against having counsel present during interrogation works
little hardship on the intelligent witness who has employed a first-class
counsel to prepare him exhaustively for his grand jury appearance.
Only the less sophisticated and less well-prepared witness, without ag-
gressive counsel, will likely be easily intimidated in the grand jury
room. As an interesting example of how aggressive defense counsel and
ample resources outside the jury room can be utilized by a suspect in
a white collar case, one corporate executive called before the Watergate
grand jury investigating illegal campaign contributions showed up with
several lawyers, a battery of stenographers and a wrist watch with an
alarm on it. Every fifteen minutes during his grand jury appearance
the executive's wrist alarm would go off, the witness would ask to be
excused, and he would rush out of the jury room and dictate to the
stenographer everything he could remember about the questions asked
and his answers. He and his lawyer would then consult on strategy for
the next fifteen minute ordeal. This strange ritual was necessary be-
cause the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit a grand
jury witness to obtain a copy of the transcript of his own testimony !4
The point of this anecdote is that the failure of the prosecutors to do
the reasonable, basically fair thing, simply because the rules do not
require it, seldom harms those with top-flight defense lawyers and money
41. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ; United
States v. Percevault, 61 F.R.D. 338 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Moceri, 359 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1973) ; United States v. Leicht-
fuss, 331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1971); United States v. Federman, 41 F.R.D. 339,
341 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 470 (N.D. Ill.
1967) ; United States v. Lubomski, 277 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ; United States
v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1966), remanded on other grounds, 401
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NOTE; A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL,
§§ 2.1-2.6 (Approved Draft 1970).
42. Three states provide for such procedure by statute in limited classes of cases.
MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.3 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-3 (Supp. 1975);
REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 10.27.120 (Supp. 1972).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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to spend on their defense. Those whose rights are more likely to be
adversely affected are witnesses who have not obtained counsel, or who
have less aggressive lawyers, or who do not have great financial re-
sources and time to invest in their own defense.
B.
The Prosecutor and the Media
The likelihood that targets of a public corruption investigation will
argue their innocence in the media by criticizing the prosecutors raises
the question of whether there are any circumstances when a prosecutor
should also be allowed to make public comments about his investigation.
The Watergate Special Prosecution Force limited its public statements
to an occasional confirmation on the record, in response to media in-
quiries, that a particular matter or area was "under investigation." Even
this statement often resulted in a considerable increase in media atten-
tion, and was treated, sometimes inaccurately, as having momentous
significance.
Similarly, press conferences were never held by the Watergate
Special Prosecutor upon return of an indictment. Instead, the office
published a "press kit" containing copies of the indictment with a cover
sheet listing the name, address and age of those charged, and summariz-
ing the charge contained in each count of the indictment, with a photo-
copy of the relevant statutes attached. In the case of a disposition by
guilty plea, the press kit usually included a copy of the letter from the
Special Prosecutor to the defense counsel recording the plea bargain
arrangement. This letter was invariably made part of the public record
upon entry of the plea. Some prosecutors see nothing wrong with the
practice of holding press conferences to comment on a pending investi-
gation or an indictment that has recently been returned, as long as the
prosecutor is discreet, sticking to matters on public record and an ex-
planation of the law involved. Special Prosecutor Maurice Nadjari in
New York City holds press conferences to announce indictments, and
at other times as well.44 Others have condemned the technique, saying
that "only two purposes, both of them improper, are served[:] ... the
defendant is severely defamed, and the likelihood of an unprejudiced
jury is reduced."45
A more difficult problem is posed by the issue of press relations
generally. As usual, ABA Prosecution Standards provide little specific
44. Statement of May 8, 1974 by Maurice Nadjari to the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, quoted in FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 94.
45. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 94.
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guidance, stating only that a prosecutor should not "exploit his office
by means of personal publicity."46 The ABA Standards Relating to
Fair Trial and Free Press are also couched in general terms, prohibiting
dissemination of information "if there is a reasonable likelihood that
such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice
the due administration of justice. '47 More specifically with regard to
the investigatory stage, the Fair Trial/Free Press Standards prohibit
any comment that goes beyond the public record or that is "not neces-
sary to inform the public that the investigation is underway, to describe
the general scope of the investigation, . . . to warn the public of any
dangers or otherwise to aid in the investigation."4 These guidelines,
intended to prevent prosecutors from revealing "details" of the investi-
gation,4 9 are of little practical assistance in the typical public corruption
case where the nature and scope of the investigation are complex and
media scrutiny is intense. Suppose that in the course of a well-publicized
investigation of low-level public officials A and B, prosecutors receive
incriminating allegations against high public official C, which they are
attempting unsuccessfully to corroborate. The ABA guidelines appar-
ently place no restriction on their effectively communicating this to the
public by announcing enlargement of the "general scope" of the investi-
gation to include new charges against a new suspect. The responsible
prosecutor would, however, undoubtedly reject such a course as im-
proper except in extraordinary circumstances. Furthermore, when the
public's attention is focused on an investigation it is often difficult to
know whether supplying background information or seemingly non-
substantive details, such as the number of days a week that the grand
jury will meet, or how many prosecutors currently are working on an
aspect of a large investigation, can amount to improper conduct.
Early in the investigation, the Watergate Special Prosecutor hired
a "public affairs officer" to handle the office's relations with the media.
Many of the experienced prosecutors of the staff were initially dubious
about the need for such a person, being accustomed to the rule that a
prosecutor's only comment on his case should be what he had to say
in formal court appearances. Some were apprehensive that establish-
ment of a permanent liaison with the press would legitimize unnecessary
press-prosecutor communication and inevitably lead to leaks. There was
46. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 1.3(a).
47. ABA STANDARDS RELATING To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, § 1.1 (Approved
Draft, 1968) ; see CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-107.
48. Id. (emphasis added). CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-107(A)-(D), parallels
these rules almost verbatim.
49. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, Commentary
to § 1.1, at 85 (Approved Draft, 1968).
[VOL. 36
PROSECUTING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
also a fear that even if the prosecution was not the source of informa-
tion about the investigation that appeared in the press, it would be
blamed for it. Without exception, however, the staff quickly came to
appreciate the importance of the public affairs officer's role. For one
thing, he kept the dozens of reporters covering the Special Prosecutor's
Office off everyone else's back. Reporters grudgingly accepted the office
policy that press queries should be routed solely through the press office;
no one else on the staff would talk to reporters about the subject of their
cases.
Supplying background information on the office, its personnel and
procedures, and the general range of matters under investigation was an
important part of the press officer's business. Even though the prose-
cutorial staff felt uneasy about it, the Special Prosecution Force de-
pended heavily on public good will. The Special Prosecutor decided
that it was important to court the press, so it was the press officer's
job to keep the "hungry piranhas" happy without giving them much
to eat - not an easy task. It was his lot to be blamed by his former
associates in the media for giving them less information about the
prosecution than they had expected. This problem is not a new one.
When Thomas E. Dewey was appointed special prosecutor to root out
Tammany Hall corruption in New York City his first act was to hold a
news conference in which he requested the press to forget for six to
nine months that he existed.5 0
One of the most difficult problems the public affairs officer faced
was persistent efforts by reporters to nag him for confirmation of inves-
tigative leads they were pursuing on their own. Sometimes he could
confirm that the prosecutors were indeed "investigating" a particular
allegation, but he seldom commented further, particularly with respect
to the substance of specific allegations. The only exception to this rule
was an occasional willingness to give off-the-record "negative guidance"
respecting stories that were about to run, when the allegations appeared
to be rebutted by evidence the prosecutors had accumulated. The pur-
pose of this negative guidance was to deter publication of highly preju-
dicial charges when facts known to the prosecutors seemed to refute
them. Technically, it might seem difficult to square this practice with
the ABA Standards, yet it appeared to be very much in the public
interest, and in the interest of those who were the subjects of the stories
to prevent the dissemination of this false and damaging information.
As a practical matter, though, negative guidance had to be used spar-
50. For a discussion of Dewey's activities as state special prosecutor appointed
to root out Tammany corruption and organized vice in New York City, see generally
R. HUGHES, ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE (1940).
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ingly, lest a pattern be established whereby reporters could treat a refusal
to give negative guidance as a roundabout confirmation of the truth of
the charges in question.
C.
Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is another area that illustrates the prosecutor's
sweeping discretionary power: It is a power to define the crime to
which the defendant will plead and thus to determine the range of pun-
ishment to which he will be subjected. Where prosecutors make sen-
tencing recommendations, they have virtual power to decide precisely
what punishment will be meted out. Plea bargaining is also an area
where, especially in public corruption cases, the practical and ethical
considerations sometimes run together.
The pressures that compel plea bargaining in a typical metropolitan
court system - crowded dockets, large backlogs, overworked public
defenders, and the prosecutorial practice of overcharging that becomes
both a cause and an effect of the plea bargaining system - were not
present in Watergate. In the public corruption case, though, there are
entirely different factors that place just as much pressure on the prose-
cutor to obtain guilty pleas. The most obvious of these is the need for
insider-witnesses. The prosecutor's willingness to reduce a potential
defendant's liability in exchange for a plea and cooperation in the in-
vestigation may be the only way of developing provable cases against
many of those involved in criminal activity. Obtaining guilty pleas
also speeds up both the process of investigation and the public exposure
of wrongdoing - not an inconsequential goal when the public is de-
manding swift action to purge the government of corruption.
Perhaps the most important reason for plea-bargaining is to avoid
the delay and risk involved in going to trial against those the prose-
cutors have determined to be deeply involved criminally, but whom
they also need as trial witnesses against others. In the urban criminal
justice system, plea-bargaining is a matter of economy and resource-
management: if everyone charged demanded his right to a jury trial,
the system would break down. In the public corruption case plea-
bargaining is a matter of tactics: the cases of some potential witnesses
must be disposed of first - by conviction, by plea or by some form of
immunity - before the prosecutors can obtain their testimony in the
trials of their confederates. If potential witnesses have to be brought
to trial first, it means a long delay in prosecuting other defendants. If
something goes wrong in these first trials - an acquittal, a hung jury,
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or a mistrial - then the ultimate targets of the investigation may escape
conviction altogether.
In the Watergate case, John Dean presented this sort of problem.
Early on, the Watergate prosecutors decided that because of Dean's
extensive involvement in the Watergate cover-up he must either plead
guilty to a felony or be prosecuted. There was no way that they could
responsibly give him a free ride, despite their desire to secure his co-
operation and testimony against those who might be even more culpable.
Yet without Dean as a Government witness, the cases against H. R.
Haldeman and John Ehrlichman were very thin indeed, at least without
the damaging tapes that at the time still reposed in the White House.
Indicting Dean as a defendant jointly with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and
John Mitchell might result in acquittal of all four. The first alternative
was to indict and try Dean and then use him after conviction as a
witness against the others. That could mean a delay of well over a
year in prosecuting the "big three" and because Dean had received
statutory testimonial immunity from the Ervin Committee, the prose-
cution might be prevented from using its best evidence against him at
trial. If problems with tainted evidence resulted in a failure to convict
Dean, it might then become impossible ever to convict the others. If
acquitted, Dean would then have no incentive to cooperate with the
prosecution; even if he were forced to testify, a jury might well be
unwilling to convict his superiors when Dean himself had been acquitted
for the same conduct. The only other alternative seemed to be to indict
Dean and his superiors simultaneously but separately. Dean's trial would
then be delayed, he would be given testimonial immunity, his testimony
against the others would be compelled, and he would be brought to trial
later. This approach also had serious disadvantages in that Dean would
be an easy target on cross-examination if he were telling his story under
immunity, and the immunity might well make any later conviction of
Dean impossible. Fortunately for the prosecutors, the dilemma was
solved by Dean's agreement to plead guilty to a broad charge of con-
spiracy to obstruct justice.
Again, established ethical guidelines give the prosecutor little or
no assistance in regard to the substance of plea bargaining. The ABA
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function5 and to Pleas of
Guilty52 deal only with the procedures of plea bargaining. The Prose-
cution Standard relating to "discretion in the charging decision," lists
51. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.1-4.3.
52. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved Draft, 1968).
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only three generalized factors that could be relevant to plea bargaining.5"
Experience with the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office indicates
that the most important criteria by which the propriety of a plea bargain
ought to be judged in a public corruption case are whether the informa-
tion to which the accused pleads guilty fairly and adequately describes
the central aspects of his criminal involvement, and whether the maxi-
mum penalty to which he is thereby subjected is not substantially dis-
porportionate to that he would have been likely to receive had he been
brought to trial and convicted.
Regarding these two criteria, the public's interest in there being
only equitable plea bargains and the prosecutor's tactical interest in
securing additional convictions against others involved in wrongdoing
appear to coincide. The insider who pleads guilty to only a small por-
tion of the crime in which he has actually participated or who receives
an extremely light sentence despite substantial criminal conduct is a
much less effective trial witness for the Government. The inequity of
the bargain can be forcefully used by the defense counsel, who will sug-
gest to the jury that the witness has "cut a deal" to save his own skin
only by implicating the others. If the insider-witness has pleaded guilty
to a charge that is seemingly irrelevant to the criminal conduct to which
he confesses on the stand while implicating others, the jury may con-
clude (a) that he has changed his story; (b) that neither the witness
nor the prosecutors believed at the time the witness pleaded guilty that
the criminal conduct he is describing on the stand was really so bad;
or (c) that the witness was not candid with the Government when the
bargain was struck and thus may also be lying now.
Therefore, the prosecutor has a significant interest in maximizing
the effectiveness of insider witnesses by insisting that they plead guilty
to charges that adequately reflect the scope of their wrongdoing and
that they be subject to criminal liability commensurate with it. The
same considerations apply with even greater force to demands for im-
munity by a potentially liable insider. Prosecutorial reluctance to con-
fer immunity, even when the insider's testimon- is crucial to the case,
may be based not only on equitable considerations but on a belief that
the individual's effectiveness as a trial witness will be destroyed if he
goes free in exchange for giving the prosecutors what they want.
Beyond the two criteria set forth above, a number of additional
considerations that might seem unjust to many people enter into plea
bargaining in the public corruption case. The most important is the
53. The three factors are: the extent of the harm caused by the offense; the
disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the offense or offender; and
cooperation of the accused. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 3.9(b).
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value of the individual's testimony to the prosecutors. Unfortunately,
the more useful testimony a potential witness has to offer the prosecu-
tors, the better deal he is going to get. If the prosecutors do not need
his testimony to convict others, then he is out of luck. Whether an
individual appears to be forthcoming, whether his personal demeanor
is such as to make him an attractive potential trial witness, or "jury
pleaser," and whether his counsel is able and aggressive all enter into
the calculus. For many, it may be difficult to accept with equanimity the
important role played in the process by bargaining power and the fact
that those whose testimony the prosecutors desperately need are going
to get a relatively good bargain, regardless of all else. But this is the
reality that all prosecutors have to take into account in striving to assure
convictions of the largest possible number of people responsible for the
crimes under investigation.
Two unusual factors complicated the plea bargaining picture in
Watergate. First, there were very few "little men": most of those
culpably involved in the cover-up would have been "big fish" in any
other prosecutor's office in the country. Traditionally, the technique for
building an organized crime case has been to work from the bottom up.
The prosecutors first obtain hard evidence against the foot-soldiers, give
them immunity in exchange for their cooperation or let them plead to
minor charges, and use their testimony against the middle-level per-
sonnel. The object then is to try to "flip" those who dealt with the real
bosses - that is, to secure guilty pleas from them and use them as trial
witnesses against the top men. This technique was less useful in Water-
gate, where almost all of those involved had held important positions
and had violated the public trust.
The second factor was an issue of relative versus absolute fairness.
In the cover-up investigation, the prosecutors were prepared to accept
one-count guilty pleas to a five-year felony charge from even the major
defendants, conditioned upon their candid cooperation with the investi-
gation. This policy was not heartily endorsed by everyone on the staff,
but there were a number of legitimate reasons for it, such as (a) the
importance of obtaining admissions of guilt from the major actors;
(b) the importance of getting all the facts before the public, which
could not be accomplished in a trial if the major defendants continued
to deny their guilt and "stonewall" it; and (c) the belief that even if
the major defendants were convicted at trial, they would probably re-
ceive not much more than five-year maximum sentences. Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and Mitchell were, in fact, each sentenced to two and one-
half to eight years after trial, despite possible sentences from twenty
to twenty-five years each. On the other hand, in the case of some
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prospective defendants who were considerably less culpable than those
three, but who had unquestionably committed serious criminal acts,
the prosecutors were unwilling to accept a plea to anything less than a
felony. The consequences of doing so would have meant a plea to a
misdemeanor, with a maximum sentence of one year and the likelihood
that the defendant might spend no more than a month or two in jail,
or even get a suspended sentence.
The best example' of this difficulty was the case of Herbert Porter,
the 32-year old scheduling assistant to Jeb Magruder at the Committee
to Re-Elect the President. Magruder had persuaded Porter that he
could show his colors as a team player by corroborating some details of
a false cover story that Magruder had dreamed up to explain why
$200,000 in cash had been given to Gordon Liddy. In the process,
Porter lied to FBI agents and committed perjury both before the
Watergate grand jury' and at the original Watergate trial, thereby
assisting the cover-up. However, Porter apparently did not know about
the cover-up in that he was not aware that the money had been given
to Liddy for illegal activity; he believed that he was just acting to save
the Re-Election Committee from some other political embarrassment.
Porter demonstrated considerably more remorse and contrition than
most of those who pleaded guilty to Watergate crimes. In fact, without
any request for immunity or special consideration he went before the
Ervin Committee and confessed his perjury on national television.
The prosecutors really had little desire to prosecute Porter, but
they could not in good conscience simply overlook what he had done.
It was impossible to separate the crimes involved in Watergate from
the rest of criminal justice, and Porter's crimes went to the heart of the
criminal justice system. The issue was whether a young man, who had
received the benefits of a fine education and family life as well as career
opportunities few Americans ever dream of, should be passed over be-
cause his crimes were relatively less serious than those committed by his
former superiors. The prosecutors could not ignore the fact that young
men and women with none of those advantages were often sentenced to
long terms of imprisonment for crimes arguably less serious than
Porter's.
Porter had to be prosecuted. The question was, on what charges?
The most appropriate thing to do was to accept from Porter a guilty
plea to one count of perjury, a five year felony. But at that time there
was a similar one-count plea offer on the table for John Dean's ac-
ceptance, and it did not seem fair to subject Porter to the very same
liability as John Dean- when his criminal involvement was so much less
than Dean's. Relatively, it seemed unjust, yet in absolute terms it did
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not. Nothing short of one felony count could be offered to Porter
because no misdemeanor charge seemed appropriate to what he had
done. The chances are that Porter would never have been prosecuted
at all had he had information the prosecutors badly needed, but he was
not so lucky. He had already admitted his guilt; his testimony impli-
cated no one but Magruder, who had already pleaded guilty. Porter
had nothing to bargain with and nothing to commend himself for special
treatment except his relative youth, relatively -negligible involvement,
and contrite posture. ,
Porter's case demonstrates that the range of crimes to which a
prospective defendant can plead is not a perfect spectrum. Porter did
not object to pleading to a felony, but the idea that he might serve more
time in jail than John Dean or John Mitchell caused him a good bit
of consternation. Where plea bargaining involves an agreement by the
prosecutor to recommend suitable punishmentt to the sentencing judge,
the prosecutor may have more flexibility to fashion a deal that fairly
reflects the defendant's degree of culpability. -The practice also supplies
additional assurance to the defendant. On the .pther hand, it gives the
prosecutor a.tremendous amount of discretionary power over sentencing,
because judges usually give great weight to, such recommendations.
The Watergate Prosecutor's Office adopted a firm.policy of refusing to
make sentencing recommendations under any :circumstances, in the be-
lief that prosecutorial sentencing recommendations give the appearance
of improper prosecutorial intrusion into what is preeminently a judicial
function. In Porter's case, had the prosecutors been able to recommend
a sentence, they certainly would have pointed out'to the sentencing judge
his relatively minor role. As it turned out, Porter did plead guilty to a
five year felony, but he spent only about a month in jail.54
Public criticism of plea bargaining in picbic corruption cases has
focused on the charge that serious political crimes by high public officials
are treated too.leniently in comparison to violent street crimes. This is
really a criticism of the entire attitude, of the judicial system toward
white collar crime. Watergate sentences may seem light by comparison
to those being served -by thousands of prisoners. throughout the country
for burglary, petty larceny and assault, but they were relatively severe
in comparison to other white collar cases where the defendant is
prominent in the community, has had an unblemished record, and has
taken a repentant attitude toward his illegal acts.
54. The ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS'OF-.GuILTY § 3.1(c) (Approved
Draft, 1968) provides that "[Slimilarly situated defendants should be afforded equal
plea agreement opportunities." The Porter example 'indicates how meaningless the
Standard is in practice. Are two prospective defendants "similarly situated": if the
testimony of one but not the other is badly needed by the prosecution to convict others?
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The case of Richard Kleindienst illustrates the judicial system's
lenience toward white collar crime. The former Attorney General
received a suspended 30-day sentence and a suspended $100 fine for
lying under oath during his own confirmation hearings. There he had
falsely denied that the White House had pressured him concerning the
filing of an appeal in an antitrust case against the ITT Corporation.5"
Had Kleindienst been prosecuted on several counts of perjury he might
have been subjected to a five to ten year maximum prison sentence.
Undoubtedly the Kleindienst-ITT affair and its disposition reflect some
of the sorriest aspects of the criminal justice system. One could fairly
say that in that case the system failed in every respect, down to the
rejection of a recommendation by the District of Columbia bar that
Kleindienst's license to practice law be suspended for one year. The
court suspended it for one month.56
But was it wrong for Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski to seek to
resolve the Kleindienst matter by a negotiated plea? Surely there would
have been less of a public outcry, whatever sentence was imposed, had
Kleindienst pleaded guilty to one count of obstructing a congressional
investigation, which is a five-year felony charge, or had the sentencing
judge not praised Kleindienst to the hills, calling him a man "of the
highest integrity . . . universally respected and admired," a man whose
only problem was that he had a heart "too loyal and considerate of the
feelings of others."' 57 The Kleindienst case is not an argument against
plea bargaining. Rather, it illustrates how easily plea bargaining can
be abused. The real problem was that the charge to which Kleindienst
55. United States v. Kleindienst, Crim. No. 74-256 (D.D.C. 1974).
56. In re Richard G. ,Kleindienst, No. S-37-35 (D.C. App. 1975). The final
disposition of disciplinary proceedings against the first federal cabinet member to
be convicted of a criminal offense since Teapot Dome indicates that many lawyers
and judges really do not take the Code of Professional Responsibility seriously when
a prominent member of the legal establishment - one of their own - is involved.
The Code states that "[b]ecause of his position in society, even minor violations of
law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession." CODE,
supra note 8, EC 1-5. The version adopted in the District of Columbia states further
that :
A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in any other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.
CODE, supra note 8, DR 1-102(A).
57. Transcript of Sentencing proceeding at 2, United States v. Kleindienst, Crim.
No. 74-256 (D.D.C. 1974).
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was permitted to enter a plea - contempt of Congress by refusal to
answer questions before a congressional committee - did not adequately
describe the conduct in which he had engaged. The contempt statute
enforces the compulsory process of Congress by punishing those who
refuse to respond to a valid subpoena. Here Kleindienst had not re-
fused to testify; he had eagerly appeared and answered all questions put
to him. Kleindienst had simply failed to tell the truth! Similarly, the
maximum penalty to which Kleindienst was subject by his plea did not
bear a reasonable relation to the liability to which he would realistically
have been exposed had he been prosecuted for perjury or obstruction.
In short, neither of the two criteria mentioned above for determining
the propriety of a negotiated plea were met.
D.
Preparation of a Government Witness for Trial
Every prosecutor knows that thorough rehearsal of a witness's
prospective testimony is essential if the witness is to make his best im-
pression on the jury. The witness has to know what questions are going
to be asked, and the prosecutor has to know what to expect from the
witness in response. What prosecutors do not often care to admit is
that the line between familiarizing oneself with the witness's honest
testimony and coaching the witness, or at least participating in shaping
the witness's testimony is a very fine one. Witness preparation is also
extremely difficult to regulate. Customarily it is a one-on-one process
between the witness and the prosecutor; no written records are kept,
personality factors enter into the equation, and distinctions between
what the witness can genuinely recall and what he believes probably
happened can soon blur.
In addition, as one commentator on ethical problems has pointed
out, the legal concept of memory as a process analogous to objective
retention of impressions by a tape recorder or video camera is based on
antiquated psychological thinkinge8 - and every good trial lawyer
knows it. All "recollection" is a form of creative reconstruction, re-
construction that is influenced by the witness's perceptions, his values,
his experience, and his self-interest. Extensive involvement by the
prosecutor in preparing testimony is unavoidable, not only because the
lay witness cannot be expected to relate precisely what is relevant with-
out a substantial amount of direction, but also because it is the prosecu-
tor who must decide how best to present his case at trial. At the same
time, the intrusion of the interrogator into the witness's process of
58. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 59-76.
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creative reconstruction is one that is bound to have a significant impact
on the substance of the witness's testimony. Again, the objectivity and
integrity of the individual prosecutor is perhaps the only protection
available to guarantee that this function is one that is undertaken
responsibly and ethically.
IV.
It is not the purpose of this article to paint an unduly pessimistic
picture of the ethical conduct of prosecuting. If under the present sys-
tem we must depend in large measure on the integrity, competence and
fairness of individual prosecutors to assure that the power of the Gov-
ernment is exercised ethically, we can be assured that, in the federal
courts at least, most prosecutors live up to a high standard. The ab-
sence of any' well-developed body of rules to control prosecutorial power
and discretion is as distressing to the prosecutor as it should be to the
public. To find oneself constantly returning to first principles or, worse,
to competing subjective notions of basic fairness in order to solve
specific problems that arise in a criminal investigation - to be con-
stantly groping about in a region of ethical twilight - is not a very
reassuring experience.
Perhaps it is a good experience to have had in the context of
Watergate. The public's attention has been preoccupied lately with the
usurpation of official power. Lawyers can feel proud of the role played
by the criminal justice system in righting wrongs of this type. But we
should not forget that dangers just as great, if not greater, are con-
stantly posed by misuse of the very system that has permitted us to
bring justice to bear. Brandeis once said:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 9
This is a lesson that every thoughtful, responsible prosecutor who has
grappled with the ethical problems inherent in the power and discretion
made available to him -soon comes to appreciate, and it is one that law-
yers and the public should take especially to heart.
59. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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